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NOTES 
I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False 
Testimony Cases 
Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the 
trial court to grant a new trial to a defendant when "required in the 
interest of justice."1 When rule 33 motions for a new trial are based 
upon newly discovered evidence,2 judges have exercised their discre-
tion with great caution. 3 Their reluctance to grant new trials on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence reflects the legitimate interest in 
protecting the finality of judgments. 4 Because of the great importance 
1. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 states: 
The court on motion of a defendant may grant a new trial to him if required in the interest 
of justice. If trial was by the court without a jury the court on motion of a defendant for a 
new trial may vacate the judgment if entered, take additional testimony and direct the entry 
of a new judgment. A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence may be made only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal 
is pending the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case. A motion for a new 
trial based on any other grounds shall be made within 7 days after verdict or finding of 
guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. 
Courts have recognized that rule 33 places new trial decisions within the trial judge's discretion. 
See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Hudson v. 
United States, 387 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1976)). The trial court's ruling will be reversed on review 
only if the trial judge abused or failed to exercise his discretion. See United States v. Wright, 625 
F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Anderson, 509 
F.2d 312, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cen. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); United States v. Curran, 465 
F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1972). In practice, the trial judge's ruling will stand unless his findings 
are wholly unsupported by the evidence. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 112 (1946); 
United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278, 1279 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. 
Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 990 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971). 
2. See generally United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); United States v. Robin-
son, 585 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979); United States v. Mackin, 561 
F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237 
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 
1973); 8A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, ~ 33.04[1] (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited 
as 8A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Annot., 59 A.L.R. FED. 657 (1982) (in which courts and 
commentators have discussed the issue of when it is appropriate for a trial judge to grant a 
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence). When this Note uses the term 
"newly discovered evidence cases," it refers to newly discovered evidence cases generally; when it 
uses the term "false testimony cases," it refers only to those cases in which newly discovered 
evidence uncovers false trial testimony. 
3. United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. i977) (citing United States v. 
Riley, 544 F.2d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1976)); United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 
1972); United States v. Austin, 387 F. Supp. 540, 542 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (citing United States v. 
Lombardozzi, 343 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 (1965)). See also 
United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 595 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (motions for a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence are "seldom granted") (citing United States v. Gamer, 529 F.2d 
962, 969 (6th Cir. 1976), ajfd., 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981)). 
4. See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 
1925 
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accorded this interest, the vast majority of courts have steadfastly ad-
hered to the long-established rule that newly discovered evidence will 
not entitle the accused to a new trial unless that evidence would proba-
bly produce a different verdict. 5 
Recognizing, however, that the integrity of the judicial process de-
pends not only upon the finality of judgments but also upon fairness to 
criminal defendants, courts have lowered the standard for retrial in 
certain situations. 6 One exception to the application of the probability 
standard arises when newly discovered evidence suggests that a gov-
ernment witness testified falsely at trial. 7 In this situation, most courts 
(1976); United States ex rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1332 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 880 (1974); United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954); Criminal Law & 
Procedure - Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard For New Trial Based Upon Perjured Testi• 
mony, 11 GOLDEN GATE 171, 174 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Law & Procedure], The 
interest in finality is founded upon the notion of judicial economy. Trial courts rarely grant 
motions for new trial where a costly retrial would be unlikely to produce a different outcome. In 
Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964), the 
court stated: 
[W]here the conduct of the trial has been less censurable, or not censurable at all, a greater 
showing of prejudice is demanded, because the interest in obtaining an ideal trial, with the 
trier of the facts considering all admissible evidence that has ever become available, and 
nothing else, is not thus supplemented and may be outweighed by the interest in avoiding a 
retrial unlikely to have a different outcome - an interest especially weighty when, as is 
normally true on collateral attack, the second trial will come long after the first. 
Appellate courts are reluctant to disturb the findings of trial courts on motions for new trial in 
deference to the "orderly administration of criminal justice." United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 
106, 111 (1946); United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401,403 (2d Cir. 1954). Because trial courts 
are better qualified to assess the impact of conflicting evidence, appellate courts will not intervene 
unless the factual findings of the trial court are not supported by any evidence. United States v. 
Johnson, 327 U.S. at 111, 112. 
5. Berry v. Georgia, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851). In Berry, the Georgia Supreme Court first set 
forth the probability standard for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Almost nil 
courts still apply the Berry rule to rule 33 motions for retrial based on newly discovered evidence. 
To succeed under Berry a defendant must show (a) that the evidence was unknown to him at the 
time of trial; (b) that the failure to discover the evidence was not due to lack of due diligence; (c) 
that the new evidence is neither cumulative nor impeaching; (d) that the new evidence would 
probably produce an acquittal. See, e.g., United States v. Street, 570 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 
1292 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Bertone, 249 F.2d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1957); SA MOORE'S FED· 
ERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 1f 33.04[1]. 
6. Typically, these cases have involved a certain degree of prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, 
where the prosecutor has suppressed material evidence favorable to the accused, the Supreme 
Court has ruled that due process mandates a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad faith 
of the prosecutor. United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83, 87 (1963). Where the prosecutor has knowledge that testimony by a government witness is 
false and fails to reveal that information, reversal of a criminal conviction is virtually automatic. 
United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). See, 
e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98 (1972); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); 
notes 46-48 infra and accompanying text. The standard for retrial is also lower when the prose-
cutor did not actually know of the perjury but should have known of it. Giglio v. United States, 
405 U.S. 150 (1972). 
7. This Note uses the term "false testimony cases" to describe situations involving no demon• 
strated prosecutorial misconduct in which newly discovered evidence suggests that a witness 
testified falsely at trial. False testimony includes testimony that is either deliberately or in-
advertantly false. See State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 587 (Minn. 1982) (reasoning that "the 
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have followed the rule set forth in Larrison v. United States, 8 requiring 
a new trial if, without the perjured testimony, the jury might have 
reached a different result.9 Two circuits, however, have rejected the 
Larrison rule, arguing that there is no legitimate reason to distinguish 
between the discovery of false testimony and any other category of 
new evidence.10 
This Note examines the question of what standard should be used 
for granting a new trial when a defendant's conviction is alleged to 
have been based, at least in part, on false testimony. Part I demon-
strates the failure of the existing standards to strike a satisfactory bal-
ance between defendants' rights and the efficient administration of the 
criminal justice system. Part II argues that motions for retrial based 
upon false testimony should be governed by a standard drawn not only 
from newly discovered evidence cases generally, but also from cases 
involving prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, Part III suggests that the 
proper test for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of false 
testimony is whether there is a significant chance that a jury with 
knowledge of false testimony would avoid conviction. This test both 
guards against convictions based upon false testimony and preserves 
the finality of judgments necessary for the sound and efficient adminis-
tration of criminal justice. A proper balance between these often com-
peting goals will enhance the interests of justice that rule 33 is 
designed to protect. 
witness' state of mind" should not "be the factor that determines whether a defendant is entitled 
to a new trial"); Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.) (stating that "the duty of a 
trial court to grant a new trial" includes situations in which the witness "was mistaken in his 
testimony"), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927). See also Carlson, False or Suppressed Evidence: 
Why a Need for the Prosecutoria/ Tie?, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1171, 1186 n.42 (1969) (arguing that as a 
practical matter, all false testimony should be treated alike since the evidentiary problem in prov-
ing perjury may be difficult or impossible to overcome). But see United States v. Strauss, 443 
F.2d 986, 989-90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 
597-98 (Minn. 1982) (Peterson, J., dissenting). 
8. 24 F.2d 82, 87 (7th Cir. 1928). 
9. In La"ison, the principal government witness recanted his testimony, but subsequently 
repudiated the recantation. The Seventh Circuit denied the motion for retrial since it was not 
reasonably well satisfied that the trial testimony was false. Most courts have accepted the Lar-
rison rule in cases involving perjured testimony. See United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 
1020 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 98-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 858 (1979); United States v. Runge, 593 F.2d 66, 74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 
(1979); United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); 
United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863, 866 n.3 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying La"ison at least where 
perjury relates to an essential element of the crime); United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116 
(3d Cir. 1973); Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 862 n.1 (5th Cir. 1956); Gordon v. 
United States, 178 F.2d 896,900 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1950). See generally 
SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 11 33.06[1]; 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRAC-
TIC~ AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D, § 557 (1982). 
10. United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 
(1980); United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 246 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 
(1976). One circuit has failed to express an opinion as to whether the probability or the might 
standard should be applied to cases involving perjured testimony. United States v. Mackin, 561 
F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977). 
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I. CRITICISM OF EXISTING STANDARDS 
The standards currently used in ruling on motions for retrial based 
upon false testimony fail to strike an acceptable balance between the 
rights of the accused and the demand for efficient administration of the 
criminal justice system in federal courts. The Larrison standard is 
prone to inconsistent application and disregards witness credibility in 
the determination of whether a jury would have reached a different 
verdict. The probability standard is capable of more consistent appli-
cation but, in its deference to judicial economy, sacrifices the rights of 
some defendants who would have had a significant chance of acquittal 
or a hung jury on retrial. 
A. The Larrison Standard 
In Larrison, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a new trial should be 
granted when each of three conditions are met: 
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given 
by a material witness is false. 
(b) That without it the jury might have reached a different 
conclusion. 
(c) That the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when 
the false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not know 
of its falsity until after the trial. 11 
The first prong of the Larrison test unfairly disadvantages defend-
ants because it fails to provide for retrial even when a material witness 
is totally discredited. Because the test initially requires that the trial 
court be "reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a mate-
11. Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928) (emphasis in original). Anal-
ysis of the third prong of the Larrison test - "that the party seeking the new trial was taken by 
surprise" - is beyond the scope of this Note. Detailed examination of this requirement is unnec-
essary since there is little controversy surrounding it. The requirement that the defense must 
exercise "due diligence" exists in cases governed by both the Larrison and the Berry rule. See 
United States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 278-79 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1978); 
United States v. Becker, 466 F.2d 886, 889-90 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); 
United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 937 (1958); United 
States v. Flynn, 131 F. Supp. 742, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). This condition is related to the efficient 
administration of justice. See note 4 supra. If the lack of due diligence on the part of defense 
counsel is of such significance as to deny the accused a fair trial, the defendant may raise an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
One commentator has noted that the due diligence requirement of Larrison actually adds very 
little to the test: 
An additional test for a recantation is said to be whether the defendant was surprised by the 
testimony and unable to meet it. This seems to be no more than an extension of the 
probability-of-acquittal test. That is, if defendant was able to meet the testimony (e.g., by 
impeaching the witness), it can hardly be claimed that the recantation might result in a 
different verdict. 
SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 11 33.05. Moore's analysis can be empirically 
verified. Of the 50 cases surveyed in which the Larrison test was employed, there was not a single 
case in which a motion for retrial was denied solely because of the defendant's failure to show he 
was taken by surprise. 
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rial witness is false," 12 retrials may be denied when judges are unable 
reasonably to determine whether a witness was, in fact, telling the 
truth. 13 Such confusion frequently occurs when the inherently suspect 
testimony of an accomplice witness14 is followed by an equally suspect 
recantation. 15 The witness may be thoroughly discredited at this 
point, but the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial under the 
Larrison test. 16 
12. 24 F.2d at 87. Although La"ison itself did not address the issue of whether the court's 
test should apply only to testimony that is deliberately false, courts have subsequently interpreted 
Larrison as applying to false testimony generally. See note 7 supra. See also United States v. 
Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); United States v. Johnson, 
142 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir.), cert dismissed, 323 U.S. 806 (1944); United States v. Hiss, 107 F. 
Supp. 128, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), ajfd., 201 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953). 
13. See United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954). In Troche, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a motion for new trial. Although he regarded the 
government witness to be "completely irresponsible," the district court judge denied a retrial, 
finding that the law required him to "be reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by the 
witness was false" and that he had "no reason to believe that on one occasion more than another 
[ the witness] was telling the truth." 
14. See note 62 infra. 
15. Because bribery, coercion, and collusion may constitute great incentives to recant, recan-
tations are "looked upon with the utmost suspicion." United States v. Johnson 487 F.2d 1278, 
1279 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 338 F.2d 137, 139 (6th Cir. 
1964)). See also Pelegrina v. United States, 601 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States ex rel 
Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); United States ex 
rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974); United 
States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1970); Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 
862 n.1 (5th Cir. 1956); United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954). 
16. The failure to establish the falsity of trial testimony is the dominant reason for denial of 
rule 33 motions for new trial based on perjured testimony. Of 50 cases in which the Larrison test 
or its substantial equivalent was employed, retrials were denied in 40. Of these 40 cases, the 
failure to establish that the trial testimony was false was a factor in all but 8. The 50 cases 
analyzed include almost all federal circuit court and district court cases in which motion for 
retrial was based at least in part on an allegation of false testimony at trial. In 32 cases retrials 
were denied solely or in part on the basis of a failure to show that the trial testimony was false or 
perjurious. See United States v. Jarett, 705 F.2d 198, 206 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 
1004 (1984); United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1st Cir. 1980); Pelegrina v. United States, 601 F.2d 18, 20 (1st 
Cir. 1979); United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); 
United States v. Runge, 593 F.2d 66, 74 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United 
States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States 
ex rel. Sostre v. Festa, 513 F.2d 1313, 1317-19 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975); United 
States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312,327 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); United 
States ex rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880 (1974); 
United States v. Johnson, 487 F.2d 1278, 1280 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. 
Briola, 465 F.2d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); United States v. 
Sloan, 465 F.2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 
990 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); United States v. DeSapio, 435 F.2d 272, 286-87 
(2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 149, 150 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Palisi, 
416 F.2d 573, 578 (2d Cir. 1969) (retrial granted on other grounds); United States v. Higgins, 412 
F.2d 789, 791 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lombardozzi, 343 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 938 (1965), Newman v. United States, 238 F.2d 861, 863 (5th Cir. 
1956); United States v. Troche, 213 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1954); Golden v. United States, 178 
F.2d 896, 900 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1950); Larrison v. United States, 24 
F.2d 82, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1928); Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
275 U.S. 527 (1927); United States v. Sutton, 557 F. Supp. 15, 18-20 (D.D.C. 1982), affd., 702 
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The second part of the Larrison test, requiring that without the 
false testimony, "the jury might have reached a different conclusion," 
is equally flawed. 17 When a material government witness is discovered 
to have committed perjury, it is virtually impossible to say that the 
jury might not have acquitted. Literally applied, therefore, the Lar-
rison test would require reversal in almost every case involving false 
testimony.18 This interpretation of the might standard would unduly 
burden the judicial system with new trials based on the slightest possi-
bility of a different verdict. 
In Stofsky, the Second Circuit contended that most courts profes-
F.2d 1206 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 827 (1983); United States v. Provenzano, 521 F. 
Supp. 403, 414-15 (D.N.J. 1981), ajfd., 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 861 (1982); 
United States v. Bonilla, 503 F. Supp. 626, 630 (D.P.R. 1980); United States v. Austin, 387 F. 
Supp. 540, 542-43 (M.D. Pa. 1974); United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 716, 718 (E.D.N.Y. 
1962); United States v. Aviles, 197 F. Supp. 536, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), ajfd., 315 F.2d 186 (2d 
Cir.), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Barcellona v. United States, 375 U.S. 32 (1963); United 
States v. Passero, 185 F. Supp. 665, 669-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1960), ajfd., 290 F.2d 238 (2d. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 368 U.S. 819 (1961); United States v. Rogers, 182 F. Supp. 786, 787 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). In 
only 8 of the cases denying retrials was the failure to establish false testimony at trial not an issue. 
See United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 556-57 (10th Cir.) (retrial denied since false testi-
mony would have no effect at trial), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States v. Hamilton, 
559 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1977) (retrial denied since the new evidence was neither 
"likely" nor "probable" to produce a different result); United States v. Becker, 466 F.2d 886, 
889-90 (7th Cir.) (retrial denied since the defense was not taken by surprise and the jury would 
not have reached a different result), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1972); Kyle v. United States, 297 
F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961) (retrial denied where the court stated that there was no more than 
an "outside chance" that jury would have reached a different result), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 
(1964); United States v. Capece, 287 F.2d 537, 538-39 (2d Cir.) (retrial denied since jury would 
not have reached a different result and defense failed to exercise due diligence), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 847 (1961); Winer v. United States, 228 F.2d 944, 952 (6th Cir.) (retrial denied because no 
probability of a different verdict), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1956); United States v. Diecidue, 
448 F. Supp. 1011, 1019 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (retrial denied since jury would not have reached a 
different verdict); United States v. Garrison, 192 F. Supp. 195, 197 (E.D. Wis.) (retrial denied 
since defendants did not show that the allegedly false statements were material or that the evi-
dence was newly discovered), affd., 296 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 
(1962). This Note offers an alternative approach to the frequent problem of the thoroughly dis-
credited witness. See note 89 infra and accompanying text. 
17. 24 F.2d at 87 (emphasis in original). Although most courts imposing the "might" test 
have not addressed the issue, it seems clear that the test requires only that the jury might have 
avoided a conviction, not that all twelve jurors would have changed their votes and acquitted. In 
other words, theLa"ison test is met if, without the false testimony, there might have been a hung 
jury. See United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Polisi, 416 
F.2d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 1969); SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at ~~ 33.04[1], 
33.06[1]. 
18. United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 
(1980), which interprets La"ison as requiring new trials in all cases involving false testimony. 
See United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 245 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976), 
explaining that, under the La"ison standard, reversal would be required: 
in cases of perjury with respect to even minor matters, especially in light of the standard jury 
instruction that upon finding that a witness had deliberately proffered false testimony in 
part, the jury may disregard his entire testimony. Thus, once it is shown that a material 
witness has intentionally lied with respect to any matter, it is difficult to deny that the jury, 
had it known of the lie, "might have acquitted." 
See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976) ("[A] jury's appraisal of a case 'might' 
be affected by an improper or trivial consideration as well as by evidence giving rise to a legiti-
mate doubt on the issue of guilt."); notes 22-26 infra and accompanying text. 
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sing to follow the La"ison might test have actually circumvented its 
harsh effect by failing to recognize that the trial testimony was perjuri-
ous or by simply concluding that the might standard remains unsatis-
fied.19 This criticism of Larrison assumes that whenever a court does 
not apply the might standard literally it is being dishonest in its appli-
cation of the test. Courts may, however, interpret the word "might" 
to have a broader meaning than that used by the Stofsky court without 
engaging in judicial dishonesty.2° 
A better criticism of the Larrison test is that "might" is a poor 
word choice because it is susceptible to differing interpretations. The 
word has been given different meanings by different courts, and the 
results have therefore been inconsistent.21 These problems of vague-
19. United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237,246 n.10 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 
(1976). See also Criminal Law & Procedure;supra note 4, at 181-82. A similar argument has 
been made about application of the probability standard. United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d 986, 
989 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971). 
20. Even assuming that courts are confined to the narrow meaning of "might" that the Stof-
sky court believed was the necessary interpretation, most courts have not subverted the test in 
practice. First, while courts have been reluctant to grant retrials in false testimony cases, the 
La"ison test has resulted in more retrials than the Stofsky court was willing to acknowledge. 
The Stofsky court surveyed seven cases and found a retrial in only one, and "even in that case the 
court concluded that the perjury was so serious that it would have called for a retrial under either 
Berry or Larrison." 527 F.2d at 246 n.10 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). A more 
comprehensive investigation reveals that of SO cases, retrials were granted in 9 using the Larrison 
test, and in only 3 of those 9 cases did the court explicitly state that a retrial would have been 
granted using either test. The cases which did not state that a retrial would have been granted 
using either test are United States v. Wallace, 528 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1976); Williams v. United 
States, 500 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1974) (using the Larrison "might" standard, but not labeling it as 
such); United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1945), revel. on other grounds, 327 U.S. 106 
(1946); Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938) (implicitly relying on the "might" test); 
United States v. Willis, 467 F. Supp. 1111 (W.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. Flynn, 130 F. Supp. 
412 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The three cases which would have granted a new trial using either the 
Berry or Larrison rule are United States v. Meyers, 484 F.2d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Atkinson, 429 F. Supp. 880, 887 (E.D.N.C. 1977); United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 
157, 158 (D.N.J. 1962). Moreover, because these decisions are typically recorded at the appellate 
level and the standard for review at that level is extremely deferential, see note 1 supra, these 
results would tend to underestimate the number of retrials actually granted under Larrison at the 
trial court level. Second, the Larrison standard is not necessarily circumvented every time a 
court makes a finding that there is no perjury. The greater likelihood is that in a substantial 
number of cases the judge had good reason to believe that the recantation itself was false. See 
note 15 supra. Finally, as already indicated, because the La"ison standard provides no guide-
lines for dealing with the effect on a jury of a discredited witness, it is extremely difficult for the 
defense to prove falsity in the first place. See notes 12-16 supra and accompanying text. , 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1979) (equating "might" 
with "possibility"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553,556 
(10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United States v. Hibler, 463 F.2d 455,460 
(9th Cir. 1972) (Larrison test met where court could not say "that the withheld information was 
so unimportant that it would have had little, if any, effect on the jury's verdict"); Kyle v. United 
States, 297 F.2d 507, 512 (2d Cir. 1961) (" 'might' means something more than an outside chance 
although much less than the 'would probably' of the Berry rule"), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 
(1964); United States v. Provenzano, 521 F. Supp. 403, 412 (D.N.J. 1981) (equating "might" 
with "possibility"), ajfd., 681 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 861 (1982); United States 
v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 716, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) ("more than an outside chance"); United 
States v. Garrison, 192 F. Supp. 195, 197 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (Larrison test not met where "alleg-
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ness and inconsistent application render the Lallison standard an un-
reliable guide for new trial decisions. 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Lallison test is that it does 
not require consideration of the effect that knowledge of perjury would 
have had on a jury's evaluation of the witness's credibility. 22 The Lar-
rison test requires a showing that the verdict might have been different 
had the false testimony simply not been in the record in the previous 
trial.23 The false testimony is thus considered only for its probative 
impact on the factual elements of the prosecution's case.24 The exis-
tence of false testimony is equally germane, however, to the credibility 
of the government's witness.25 In cases in which the defense docu-
ments that a government witness has perjured a portion of his perti-
edly false testimony concerns minor details not material to the guilt of the defendants"), ajf d., 
296 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962). 
22. See Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246; Criminal Law & Procedure, supra note 4, at 178. The 
language of the test itself seems to suggest that the appellate court is to assume that the jury did 
not have knowledge of the perjury since the test looks to the original trial and asks what verdict 
the jury would have reached without the perjured testimony. Some courts, however, have modi-
fied La"ison to include the effects of the perjury on jury evaluation of witness credibility. In 
United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945), revd. on other grounds, 327 U.S. 106 
(1946), for example, the court for the Seventh Circuit indicated that under Larrison, the jury may 
be charged with knowledge of the perjury. The court quoted Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 
973, 976 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927), for the proposition that "a new light is 
thrown on [the perjured testimony] by the admission that it was false; so that, on a new trial, 
there would be strong circumstance in favor of the losing party that did not exist and therefore 
could not have been shown, at the time of the original trial." See also United States v. Willis, 467 
F. Supp. 1111, 1113 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (expanding Larrison to include the effect of the jury's 
knowledge of the perjury on a future trial). 
23. The Seventh Circuit set forth the theoretical framework for looking backward to the 
effect on the previous trial in United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945), revd. on 
other grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946): 
On an ordinary motion for new trial, the court is concerned with the probable effect which 
the newly discovered evidence might have upon another trial. In contrast, where the motion 
is based on false swearing, the concern of the court must be as to the probable effect pro-
duced on the trial already had. In the former case, the court looks to the future, in the latter 
case to the past, and the sole question is whether the defendants' right to a fair and impartial 
trial has been prejudiced by reason of the false testimony. 
24. See note 22 supra. If the court is doing no more than analyzing the previous trial for 
prejudice, all it need do is remove the factor that caused the jury's verdict to be prejudiced, in this 
case the perjured testimony. It need not take the additional step of injecting the entirely new 
element of witness credibility. 
25. It is ironic that in United States v. Johnson, 149 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1945), revd. on other 
grounds, 327 U.S. 106 (1946), the first decision stating that the sole concern in false testimony 
cases is the effect of the false swearing on the original jury, the court also quoted Martin v. 
United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1927), to support the proposition that because of the 
effect of the perjury on the witness's credibility at "a new trial there would be a strong circum• 
stance in favor of the losing party that did not exist ... at the time of the original trial." (em-
phasis added). Both fairness and efficiency suggest strong reasons for looking at the potential 
effect of the new evidence on retrial. In fairness terms, the credibility of the witness may have 
been the key factor that led the jury to convict. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959); 
United States v. Atkinson, 429 F. Supp. 880, 885 (E.D.N.C. 1977). In efficiency terms, it makes 
more sense to ask whether a new trial would make any difference rather than to have retrials 
every time a prosecution witness's perjury caused some degree of prejudice no matter how frivo-
lous. But cf United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1979), in which the Ninth Circuit 
was unable to see "any practical difference" between the previous trial and a new trial in evaluat-
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nent testimony, it would be unfair to the defendant to consider the 
remainder of the witness's testimony unimpeached. Indeed, the jury's 
assessment of witness credibility may ultimately determine the guilt or 
innocence of the accused. 26 
B. The Stofsky Test 
In United States v. Stofsky, 27 the Second Circuit rejected the Lar-
rison standard for new trial in false testimony cases in favor of the 
probability-of-acquittal standard traditionally applied in newly discov-
ered evidence cases. Under the probability test, retrial will be granted 
only when the new evidence is so material that it "probably" would 
produce a different verdict at the new trial. 28 The Stofsky court found 
that the probability test would allow courts to "act forthrightly" and 
would result in fewer retrials than the might test. 29 In addition, unlike 
the Larrison test, the Stofsky standard properly focuses on the effect 
that evidence of perjury has on witness credibility as well as on the 
factual elements of the government's case. 30 
ing the weight of perjured testimony. This observation only has merit, however, if the effect of 
the perjured testimony on witness credibility is considered in both cases. 
26. The Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) recognized that "[t]he 
jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of 
guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in 
testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." 
27. 527 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 819 (1976). 
28. While the Stofsky test allows a new trial when newly discovered evidence of false testi-
mony would probably have produced "a different verdict," 527 F.2d at 247, most courts applying 
the probability test in cases involving other types of newly discovered evidence have required that 
"the newly discovered evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal" on retrial. United 
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Wright, 625 
F.2d 1017, 1019 Qst Cir. 1980); Pelegrina v. United States, 601 F.2d 18, 21 Qst Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); United 
States v. Robinson, 585 F.2d 274, 278 n.4 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979); 
United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978); United 
States v. Mackin, 561 F.2d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 959 (1977); United States 
v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Iannelli, 528 F.2d 1290, 1292 (3d Cir. 
1976); Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 940 
(1977); United States v. Williams, 415 F.2d 232, 233 (4th Cir. 1969); Pitts v. United States, 263 
F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 919 (1959); United States v. Bertone, 249 F.2d 
156, 160 (3d Cir. 1957); Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Johnson 
v. United States, 32 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1929). The slight difference in wording between 
"probably produce an acquittal" and "probably produce a different verdict" is most likely not 
intended to have any effect on the applicable standard of review. What the difference does re-
flect, however, is an obvious confusion on the part of the courts as to whether the test is to be 
measured against a twelve-juror standard or a hung-jury standard. Given the extreme difficulty 
of predicting how a jury will react whenever any new evidence is introduced, one wonders 
whether such subtle distinctions really make any difference in practice. See generally Teitel-
baum, Sutton-Barbere & Johnson, Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges 
Identify the Impact of Improper Evldence on Juries?, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1147. 
29. 527 F.2d at 246. Cf. notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text. 
30. In concluding that the impact on a jury of witness credibility should be assessed in ruling 
on motions for new trial, the Stofsky court stated: 
Another problem that does not appear to have been the subject of explicit reported judicial 
consideration, at least in this circuit, is whether, in considering a motion for a new trial on 
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Despite these apparent improvements over the Larrison test, there 
are good reasons for viewing the Stofsky test with skepticism. First, by 
placing disproportionate emphasis on efficient judicial administration, 
the probability test may deprive defendants of their constitutionally 
guaranteed right to a fair trial.31 Since the test denies retrial to de-
fendants with improbable yet significant chances of acquittal, 32 many 
defendants will be convicted on the basis of false testimony. A trial 
that results in conviction on the basis of false testimony may be so 
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of due process.33 Thus, 
grounds of perjury, the court should assume that the jury would have had before it the 
newly-discovered evidence not only for its probative value with respect to the issues but also 
to demonstrate that the witness had perjured himself with respect to that evidence, the latter 
being pertinent, of course, for its impeaching value. Put another way, should we, in deter-
mining whether truthful testimony by the witness would probably have changed the jury's 
verdict, also assume that the jury would have known that he had lied under oath about the 
matter? Since the witness's credibility could very well have been a factor of central impor-
tance to the jury, indeed every bit as important as the factual elements of the crime itself, 
• . . we would answer this question in the affirmative. Upon discovery of previous trial 
perjury by a government witness, the court should decide whether the jury probably would 
have altered its verdict if it had had the opportunity to appraise the impact of the newly-
discovered evidence not only upon the factual elements of the government's case but also 
upon the credibility of the government's witness. 
527 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted). 
31. The concept of due process set forth in the fifth amendment and extended to the states by 
the fourteenth amendment includes more than merely notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Due process "embodies the fundamental concep-
tions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions." 294 U.S. at 112. See 
also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968). 
32. If, as the Stofsky court argued, a literal application of the might standard would make 
retrials virtually automatic, then it may be argued with equal force that a literal application of 
the probability standard would deny retrials to defendants whenever a judge determined there 
was a 50% or lower chance of acquittal at a new trial. Thus, convictions may be upheld even 
where defendants have a significant chance of acquittal. The meaning of "significant" in this 
context is not a precise mathematical figure that can be empirically verified. Instead, what is 
meant is a common sense or intuitive judgment that the chances that the innocent will be made 
to suffer are simply too high to tolerate. 
33. Although intuitively it might seem that convictions based even in part on perjured testi-
mony are fundamentally unfair and, therefore, implicate due process concerns, this is not the 
majority view. See United States ex rel Williams v. Walker, 535 F.2d 383, 386-87 (7th Cir, 
1976) (''The introduction of perjured testimony without more does not violate the constitutional 
rights of the accused. It is the knowing and intentional use of such testimony by the prosecuting 
authorities that is a denial of due process of law."); see also Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411,413 
(1942) (dicta suggesting that petitioner "cannot, of course, contend that mere recantation of 
testimony is in itself ground for invoking the Due Process Clause against a conviction"); Jackson 
v. United States, 384 F.2d 375, 376 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 932 (1968); Marcella v. 
United States, 344 F.2d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 1965) (stating that the "movant must show that the 
testimony was perjured and that the prosecuting officials knew at the time such testimony was 
used that it was perjured"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016 (1966); Green v. United States, 313 F.2d 
6, 8 n.2 (1st Cir.) (holding that "it is not enough that perjury be shown; there must be proof that 
it was committed with the knowledge of the prosecution"), petition for cert. dismissed, 372 U.S. 
951 (1963); Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 970 
(1963); Clark v. Warden, 293 F.2d 479, 482 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 877 (1962); 
Kyle v. United States, 266 F.2d 670, 674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 870 (1959); United 
States v. Jakalski, 237 F.2d 503, 504-505 (7th Cir. 1956) (arguing that "introduction of perjured 
testimony without more does not violate the constitutional rights of the accused"), cert. denied, 
353 U.S. 939 (1957); Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d 826, 832 (8th Cir.) (stating that "the fact 
that there may be false testimony does not alone and of itself vitiate a judgment"), cert. denied, 
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while the introduction of false testimony of low materiality would not 
be a per se violation of the due process clause, the introduction of false 
testimony that has a significant chance of affecting the jury's verdict is 
so fundamentally unfair that it jeopardizes the defendant's due process 
rights.34 
351 U.S. 986 (1956); Tilghman v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 661, 662 (10th Cir. 1948) (stating that "the 
mere introduction of perjured testimony in the trial of a criminal case is not enough to void the 
judgment"). Nevertheless, there is some authority suggesting that the mere introduction of false 
testimony at trial may constitute a denial of due process: 
It is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the use of testimony known by the prosecu-
tion to be perjured offends due process. While the petition did not allege that the prosecu-
tion knew that petitioner's codefendants were lying when they implicated petitioner, the 
State now knows that the testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false. No 
competent evidence remains to support the conviction. Deprivation of a hearing under 
these circumstances amounts in my opinion to a denial of due process of law. 
Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 290-91 (1956) (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Warren, Black, 
and Clark, J.J.) (citations omitted). See also United States v. Diecidue, 448 F. Supp. 1011, 1018 
(M.D. Fla. 1978) (observing the "strong suggestion in some decisions that the same, less strin-
gent standard of materiality applies whenever perjury is shown regardless of prosecutorial entan-
glement"); People v. Hilliard, 65 m. App. 3d 642, 382 N.E.2d 441 (1978) ("Known to the state 
or not, the use of its judicial process to convict and imprison on perjured testimony is a miscar-
riage of justice which is abhorent to fundamental fairness and as such intolerable."); State v. 
Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 (Minn. 1982) (although basing its decision on the supervisory 
role of an appellate court and not "feel[ing] the need to reach the constitutional issue," neverthe-
less stating that the defendant had a "right to be tried, insofar as possible, on the basis of true and 
correct evidence; to deny him this right is to deny him a fair trial"); Carlson, supra note 7, at 
1171, 1176. The leading case advocating due process protection in perjured testimony cases is 
Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 1938), in which the Sixth Circuit stated: 
"[T]he fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political 
institutions" must with equal abhorrence condemn as a travesty a conviction upon perjured 
testimony if later, but fortunately not too late, its falseness is discovered, and that the state 
• . • is required to afford a corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong, if consti-
tutional rights are not to be impaired. . . . The appellant is not to be sacrificed upon the 
altar of a formal legalism too literally applied when those who from the beginning sought his 
life in effect confess error, when impairment of constitutional right may be perceived, and 
the door to clemency is closed. 
See also Kelly v. Ragen, 129 F.2d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 1942) (citing Jones with approval); Imbler v. 
Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795, 804-05 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (also citing Jones with approval); United 
States ex rel Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. ID. 1949) (citing Jones as au-
thority that defendant was deprived of due process of law). But see United States ex rel Wil-
liams v. Walker, 535 F.2d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1976) (refusing to apply Jones); Burks v. Egeler, 512 
F.2d 221, 229 (6th Cir.) ("unable to approve of the precise language" of Jones "as a continuing 
guideline"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Hodge v. Huff, 140 F.2d 686, 688 (D.C. Cir.) 
(limiting Jones to a narrow set of facts), cert denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1944). This Note is not in 
conflict with the weight of the authority to the extent that such authority concludes that the mere 
introduction of false testimony without more does not violate the rights of the accused. It is the 
position of this Note that when the introduction offalse testimony rises to a sufficiently high level 
of materiality, meaning evidence which has a significant chance of affecting the jury, due process 
rights are implicated. See notes 34, 72-74 infra and accompanying text. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381 (1985) ("[A] constitutional error 
occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its 
suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial"); United States v. Agurs, 427 
U.S. 97, 109-10 (1976) ("The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information ... might 
have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional 
sense."); United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 743-44 (10th Cir. 1974); Shuler v. Wainwright, 
491 F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that "the real question is whether the prosecution 
failed to disclose evidence so material to the guilt or innocence of the accused that he was denied 
a fair trial") (emphasis in original). In cases involving the inadvertent suppression of evidence 
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Even if the probability standard does not result in fundamental 
unfairness to defendants having a significant chance of a different ver-
dict on retrial, it may violate the rule of fairness implicit in rule 33. 
The "interest of justice" requires that judicial efficiency be balanced 
against the need for the "untainted administration of justice."35 Con-
viction on the basis of false testimony, especially where there is a sig-
nifi.cant chance that the conviction would not have occurred but for 
the perjury, arguably violates this standard of fairness. The fairness 
requirement of rule 33 may be invoked without regard to an independ-
ent constitutional violation. 36 
Third, by needlessly confusing the roles of judge and jury, the Stof-
sky probability standard threatens the defendant's sixth amendment 
right to a jury trial.37 The right to trial by jury means that a jury, not 
a judge, must make the final determination of the innocence or guilt of 
the accused. 38 The function of the trial judge is to decide only whether 
the newly discovered evidence should be submitted to the jury, not 
what its ultimate weight should be.39 Because there is "no way for a 
court to determine that the perjured testimony did not have control-
ling weight with the jury," when the judge attempts to second-guess 
by the prosecutor, courts have found due process violations when the evidence rose to such a 
level of significance that its nondisclosure resulted in fundamental unfairness. See United States 
v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033, 1034-35 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); Link v. 
United States, 352 F.2d 207, 212-13 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966); Ashley v. 
Texas, 319 F.2d 80, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 931 (1963). 
35. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 
124 (1956). 
36. See SA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at ~ 33.06[1]. 
37. U.S. CONsr. amend. VI ("the accused shall enjoy the right to .•. an impartial jury."), 
The argument that the probability standard confuses the roles of judge and jury applies to a 
certain extent to all rule 33 newly discovered evidence cases. The problem is much more serious 
when false testimony is involved, however, because in false testimony cases it is probable that the 
resulting trial was in some way substantively "unfair'' to the defendant. In newly discovered 
evidence cases, on the other hand, the omission may have had a neutral, rather than a negative, 
impact. Because the false testimony may be presumed to have had a negative impact, and be-
cause it is difficult to estimate how much weight the jury gave it, the power of the judge to 
determine how the jury would have reacted in the absence of the false testimony should be nar-
row. See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text. 
38. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 116-118 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Pettine 
v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 F. 489, 494 (C.C.N.M. 1912); United States v. Mitchell, 29 
F.R.D. 157, 159 (D.N.J. 1962). 
39. United States v. Mitchell, 29 F.R.D. 157, 159 (D.N.J. 1962). In Mesarosh v. United . 
States, 352 U.S. 1, 12 (1956), a case involving a witness who had been thoroughly discredited, the 
Court stated: 
The district judge is not the proper agency to determine that there was sufficient evidence at 
the trial, other than that given by Mazzei, to sustain a conviction of any of the petitioners. 
Only the jury can determine what it would do on a different body of evidence, and the jury 
can no longer act in this case. 
See also Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97, 117 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the Court's rule which "explicitly establishe[d] the judge as the trier of fact with respect to evi-
dence withheld by the prosecution resulted in 'usurp[ing) the function of the jury as the trier of 
fact in a criminal case'"); Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 105, 107-08 (9th Cir. 1974) (quot-
ing Mesarosh); Pettine v. Territory of New Mexico, 201 F. 489, 493-94 (C.C.A.N.M. 1912), 
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the jury by determining whether it probably would have acquitted, he 
usurps the jury's function.40 
The principal justification for the probability standard is avoidance 
of needless trials. This, in turn, is said to protect the integrity of the 
judicial process.41 But judicial integrity also requires a proper balance 
between fairness and efficiency.42 The probability test actually sacri-
fices judicial integrity by placing a disproportionate emphasis on the 
finality interest and relegating the goal of ensuring that convictions are 
based upon truthful testimony to secondary status. 43 In order to pre-
serve the balance between fairness and efficiency, the courts must exer-
cise a higher degree of scrutiny than the probability standard requires 
for evaluating the effects of false testimony at trial.44 
In the final analysis, neither the Larrison test nor the Stofsky test 
has been the subject of close scrutiny, and both are demonstrably inad-
equate standards for retrial. A comprehensive analysis of the circum-
stances surrounding the false testimony cases is necessary in order to 
arrive at a more appropriate solution. This analysis is aided by exam-
ining the way courts have handled situations related to the false testi-
mony cases. 
40. Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973, 976 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 527 (1927). It 
could, of course, be argued that the judge must second-guess the jury and thereby usurp its 
function no matter what standard is used for granting new trials. The problem is, nevertheless, 
more severe when the probability standard is used. First, the probability test obviously requires 
the judge to predict how the jury would react with a greater degree of certainty than other 
standards that would give the dispute back to the jury in borderline cases. Second, because the 
probability test requires the judge to make the more precise prediction of whether twelve jurors 
would acquit, it requires more accuracy and creates greater problems of usurpation than does the 
hung-jury standard. See notes 17 & 28 supra. 
41. See, e.g., United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
819 (1976); United States ex rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 880 (1974). 
42. The concept of judicial integrity is illustrated in the court's statement in Jones v. 
Kentucky: 
It is, of course, perfectly true . . . that great and inexcusable delay in the enforcement of the 
criminal law has been a serious evil of the times and has brought the administration of the 
criminal laws into disrepute. But we progress little if freeing the administration of justice 
from one evil we permit it to become enmeshed in a second, and in our effort to achieve 
promptness go forward with such haste as to close the door upon the "calm spirit of regu-
lated justice." 
Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 337-38 (6th Cir. 1938). See note 33 supra. See also Kyle v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); note 4 supra. 
Judicial integrity is in jeopardy when a constitutional violation has occurred. The existence of 
such a violation is not, however, prerequisite to judicial concern with preserving the integrity of 
the criminal process. Rule 33 is itself a means of insuring judicial integrity. See note 76 infra. 
43. Cf. United States v. Curran, 465 F.2d 260, 262 (7th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Kentucky, 97 
F.2d 335, 337-38 (6th Cir. 1938); United States v. Ochs, 548 F. Supp. 502, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), 
affd., 742 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983). 
44. Cf. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. l, 9 (1956) ("The dignity of the United States 
Government will not permit the conviction of any person on tainted testimony."); Communist 
Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956) (stating 
that "fastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make 
certain that the doing of justice be made • . . manifest"). 
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II. STANDARDS FOR NEW TRIAL IN CONTEXTS RELATED TO THE 
FALSE TESTIMONY CASES 
Probability of acquittal is well established as the measure of a de-
fendant's motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evi-
dence. Courts have also articulated clear standards for retrial in cases 
involving prosecutorial misconduct. The rules governing the granting 
of retrials in both the prosecutorial misconduct and the newly discov-
ered evidence cases provide important insights into the resolution of 
the conflict surrounding false testimony. 
A. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Cases 
Although the Supreme Court has declined to answer the question 
of what the appropriate new trial standard should be in false testimony 
cases,45 the standards in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct are 
well established. The test for new trial in cases in which the prosecu-
tor has knowingly allowed the use of perjured testimony is whether 
there is "any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have 
affected the judgment of the jury."46 This rule applies even when the 
45. See United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 n.5 (1946). 
46. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). Agurs did not deal with either deliberate prosecutorial misconduct or 
"the veracity of any of the prosecution witnesses." 427 U.S. at 104. Instead, Agurs involved the 
more co=on type of case in which the prosecution possesses evidence which is in some way 
favorable to the defense. In such cases, the prosecutor may have a constitutional duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. The Agurs Court delineated separate rules, depending upon whether or 
not the defense had made a request for specific information prior to trial pursuant to the Court's 
holding in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Where such a Brady request is made, the 
Agurs Court argued that Brady required only "that the suppressed evidence might have affected 
the outcome of the trial." 427 U.S. at 104. See Co=ent, The Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure: 
From Brady to Agurs and Beyond, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 197, 201-202 (1978). But see 
United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3384 (1985) (changing the rule in specific request cases 
to granting a new trial only if there is a "reasonable probability" that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense the result of the proceeding would have been different). Where no spe-
cific request for exculpatory information is made - the situation in Agurs - the Court held that 
the proper standard to determine constitutional error was whether "the omitted evidence creates 
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." 427 U.S. at 112. The Agurs Court claimed that 
its reasonable doubt standard accurately "describe[d] the test which courts appear to have ap-
plied in actual cases," 427 U.S. at 113, and the Court obviously believed that this standard was 
less strict than that of probable acquittal applied in newly discovered evidence cases. See 427 
U.S. at 111. But, as Justice Marshall argued in dissent, the Court's standard imposes on the 
defendant a burden which 
is at least as 'severe' as, if not more 'severe' than, the burden he generally faces on a Rule 33 
motion. Surely if a judge is able to say that evidence actually creates a reasonable doubt as 
to guilt in his mind (the Court's standard), he would also conclude that the evidence "proba-
bly would have resulted in acquittal" (the general Rule 33 standard). In short, in spite of its 
own salutary precaution, the Court treats the case in which the prosecutor withholds evi-
dence no differently from the case in which evidence is newly discovered from a neutral 
source. 
427 U.S. at 115-16 (footnote omitted). Actually, the Court and Marshall were in complete agree-
ment in their analyses of the case. They differed only with respect to the correct solution. The 
majority believed it was adopting a lesser standard of materiality, while Marshall saw it as a 
higher standard. Similarly, this Note agrees with the majority's analysis in Agurs, but it favors 
the "significant chance" test offered by Justice Marshall in dissent simply because that test is 
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suppression of evidence is relevant only to witness credibility.47 In 
practice, lower courts have interpreted these Supreme Court rulings to 
mean that a showing of intentional misconduct on the part of the pros-
ecutor "will mandate a virtual automatic reversal of a criminal 
conviction. "48 
Courts have developed a flexible new trial standard in cases involv-
ing prosecutorial negligence.49 In cases in which the prosecution has 
inadvertently suppressed evidence favorable to the accused, the courts 
have almost universally required some intermediate showing of mate-
riality that is higher than the standard of automatic reversal for delib-
erate suppression, but lower than the probability-of-acquittal standard 
for the innocent discovery of false testimony.50 The nature of the 
showing required to assess the impact of perjury or other newly dis-
covered evidence on a jury depends largely upon the degree of 
more precise and less susceptible to misinterpretation than the majority's "reasonable doubt" 
formulation. Marshall not unreasonably saw the Court's rule as "explicitly establish[ing] the 
judge as the trier of fact with respect to evidence withheld by the prosecution," and thus 
"usurp[ing] the function of the jury as the trier of fact in a criminal case." 427 U.S. at 117. The 
standard put forth by Marshall, that there must be "a significant chance that the withheld evi-
dence • . . could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a 
conviction," 427 U.S. at 119, was the prevailing standard of materiality used in the federal courts 
at the time. See notes 60, 73 & 90 infra. In contrasno the reasonable doubt test, the significant 
chance rule avoids the problem of usurpation by recognizing that "the determination must be in 
terms of the impact of an item of evidence on the jury." 427 U.S. at 119. See note 92 infra. 
47. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150, 154-55 (1972); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98 (1972); United States v. Runge, 593 
F.2d 66, 73 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979); United States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 
1364 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1043 (1977). 
48. United States v. Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 
(1976). See also United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Harris, 462 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 993 (1974); Kyle v. United 
States, 297 F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); United States v. 
Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 608 (E.D. Mich. 1979), affd., 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 
U.S. 912 (1980). But see United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985) (reversal not required 
when willfull suppression by prosecutor of evidence specifically requested by the defense does not 
undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial). 
49. Cases of prosecutorial negligence typically involve situations in which the prosecution 
inadvertently fails to disclose information favorable to the accused. When the nondisclosure 
concerns evidence bearing upon the veracity of government witnesses, as, for example, the negli-
gent failure to disclose promises of favorable treatment made to accomplice witnesses, the non-
disclosure resembles false testimony. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); 
United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357 (2d 
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1043 (1977); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 
1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 933 (1974). 
50. Where there has been negligent nondisclosure of evidence relating to false testimony, 
courts have suggested a number of intermediate tests of materiality. See, e.g., Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (new trial required if false testimony could "in any reasonable 
likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury"); United States v. Butler, 567 F.2d 885, 889-90 
(9th Cir. 1978) (requiring a new trial "wherever the nondisclosed evidence might reasonably have 
affected the jury's judgment of some material point, without necessarily requiring a supplemen-
tary finding that it also would have changed its verdict"); United States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 
583, 607 (E.D. Mich. 1979), ajfd., 633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 
(1981). 
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prosecutorial participation.5i 
Courts have articulated three reasons for departing from the tradi-
tional probability test in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct. 
The principal concern of the courts, as expounded in United States v. 
Agurs, 52 is the extent to which the presence of false or perjured testi-
mony and the failure to disclose information related to such testimony 
"involve[s] a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial pro-
cess."53 A second and related problem is the need to deter 
prosecutorial malfeasance. The Agurs Court reasoned that if the same 
standard· were applied in misconduct cases as in other newly discov-
ered evidence cases, "there would be no special significance to the 
prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice."54 Finally, the 
Supreme Court has concluded that the knowing use of false testimony 
by the prosecution constitutes a denial of the due process right to a fair 
trial. 55 If the defense requests exculpatory evidence, negligent sup-
pression of this evidence by the prosecutor may violate due process 
even if she acts in good faith. 56 
The reasons justifying lenient treatment of motions for new trial in 
prosecutorial misconduct cases - particularly in those cases where 
mere negligence is demonstrated - suggest the application of a similar 
standard in false testimony cases where misconduct is absent. 57 First, 
"corruption of justice" is a central concern in all false testimony cases 
regardless of prosecutorial misconduct, since the introduction of false 
testimony material to the guilt of the accused subverts the truth-seek-
ing function of the trial process. 58 Indeed, the Agurs court emphasized 
that it is the presence of perjured testimony, more than the fact of 
misconduct, that leads to the corruption of the trial process. 59 
51. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 
52. 427 U.S. 97 (1976). 
53. 427 U.S. at 103-04. 
54. 427 U.S. at 111. See also United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1975). 
55. Napue v. Illinois 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
109 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 797-98 (1972); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 
112 (1935); notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text. 
56. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that when a specific request for the 
information is made "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused • . . 
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment irrespective of 
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution"). 
57. Unless clearly specified in the text, when this Note refers to a lenient or strict standard of 
materiality, it means lenient or strict from the point of view of the defense. In other words, a 
strict standard of materiality is one that is difficult for the defense to meet whereas a lenient 
standard is one that is easy for the defense to meet. 
58. See Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 337 n.1 (6th Cir. 1938). See also In re Michael, 326 
U.S. 224, 227 (1945) ("All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since it may pro-
duce a judgment not resting on truth. Therefore it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the 
sole ultimate objective of a trial."). 
59. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). See also Mesarosh v. United States, 
352 U.S. I, 9 (1956) (stating that "the dignity of the United States government will not permit the 
conviction of any person on tainted testimony"). Mesarosh did not involve a claim of 
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Although there might be no great cause for concern when the false 
evidence is of such a low level of materiality that it could not reason-
ably have affected the jury's judgment, when there is at least a signifi-
cant chance that the jury would not have convicted the defendant but 
for the false testimony, the correct administration of justice would 
seem to mandate a new trial. 60 
Second, because the threat of automatic reversal is a strong deter-
rent in prosecutorial misconduct cases, it is possible to lower the stan-
dard for new trial in false testimony cases and still retain an incentive 
for prosecutors to be particularly diligent in their obligation to serve 
the cause of justice. A :flexible standard of materiality is essential to 
reach those false testimony cases in which prosecutorial participation 
in the perjury is difficult or impossible to prove. 61 
prosecutorial misconduct, yet the Supreme Court ruled that the fact that a principal government 
witness had been totally discredited was alone sufficient to mandate a new trial. Although lower 
courts have attempted to distinguish Mesarosh from other false testimony cases, the distinctions 
drawn in these later cases are ultimately unpersuasive. Mesarosh has been distinguished on two 
grounds. First, the witness in Mesarosh had been totally discredited. See United States v. 
Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 942 (1980); United States v. 
Stofsky, 527 F.2d 237, 244 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976). Second, Mesarosh 
did not involve a ruling on a motion of the defendant pursuant to rule 33, but was instead the 
result of information volunteered by the Attorney General. See Krasny, 607 F.2d at 845; United 
States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 99 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979). The argu-
ment that Mesarosh is different because it involved a wholly discredited witness is flawed since 
any witness who perjures himself may be completely discredited. See Pettine v. Territory of New 
Mexico, 201 F. 489, 493 (C.C.N.M. 1912); Criminal Law Survey, 13 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 591, 
844-45 (1980). Indeed, typically the judge will instruct the jury that if certain testimony of a 
given witness is false, the jury may disregard the entire testimony of that witness. See note 18 
supra. The fact that Mesarosh did not involve a rule 33 motion is irrelevant. The cases suggest 
no reason why it should make a difference that the government rather than the defendant raised 
the motion, and given that rule 33 motions are evaluated in light of justice rather than due 
process, it is arguable that the standard for evaluating these motions should be even lower than 
the one for constitutional claims. The Mesarosh case, however, offers little guidance for deter-
mining what standard of materiality is appropriate for granting new trials in false testimony 
cases. As the Stofsky court noted, Mesarosh itself would not have survived even the probability 
test. Stofsky, 527 F.2d at 246. But see Krasny, 607 F.2d at 847 (Ely, J., dissenting) (considering 
application of Larrison test "required by the teachings of Mesarosh v. United States"); Kyle v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964) (Mesarosh 
suggests that while there must be some showing of materiality, "very little will do"). 
60. Courts have utilized the "correct administration of justice" rationale to justify the grant-
ing of new trials in negligent nondisclosure cases. United States v. Consolidated Laundries 
Corp., 291 F.2d 563,571 (2d Cir. 1961) (denial of new trial "inconsistent with the correct admin-
istration of criminal justice in the federal courts, which it is our duty as an appellate court to 
supervise"); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290-91 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("fair administration of 
criminal justice" mandates new trial in negligent suppression cases if disclosure "might have led 
the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt"). A denial of a new trial in 
inadvertent suppression cases is "inconsistent with the correct administration of justice" only 
when "there was a significant chance that this added item, developed by skilled counsel as it 
would have been, could have induced a reasonable doubt in the minds of enough jurors to avoid a 
conviction." United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969). See also United States v. 
Mayersohn, 452 F.2d 521, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1971); notes 90 & 92 infra. Cf. State v. Caldwell, 322 
N.W.2d 574, 586 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (employing "correct administration of criminal justice" ra-
tionale to justify a "might" standard in false testimony cases). 
61. See Carlson, supra note 7, at 1185-87. A looser standard of materiality might also be 
necessary in order to reach those cases in which the prosecutor is innocent, but the police or 
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Even absent demonstrated prosecutorial mis- or malfeasance, there 
are good reasons to believe that the government has acted with tacit 
complicity in a false testimony case. In many cases, although the 
prosecutor has no knowledge of the perjury, she takes action that in-
duces the false testimony. The vast majority of recantation and per-
jury cases involve situations in which the government has given its 
witness great incentives to lie. 62 Typically, these witnesses are paid 
informants or co-conspirators who have been promised something in 
return for their testimony.63 Having made convictions easier and false 
testimony more likely by purchasing the testimony of its witnesses, the 
other local officials have participated in the perjury. Suppression by the police may be as destruc-
tive to the fair administration of criminal justice as suppression by the prosecutor. Id. at 1177-
78. Thus, courts have held that the prosecutor should be charged with the knowledge of lower 
government agents. See, e.g., Barbee v. Warden, 341 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964); see also Giles 
v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring). 
62. The fact that co-conspirators and accomplice witnesses have great incentives to lie has 
been well documented. See, e.g., United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (4th Cir. 
1980); United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273 n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 911 
(1976); United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The need for careful scrutiny 
of an uncorroborated accomplice reflects the danger, underscored by experience, that he may be 
giving a false account to secure lenient treatment."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); United 
States v. Leonard, 494 F.2d 955, 974-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) (testimony of 
accomplice witnesses is suspect since they might have "reason to expect that their sentence might 
depend upon their testimony"); Marrs, The Informant and Accomplice Witness: Problems for the 
Prosecution, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAc. & PROC. 243, 244 (1975); Note, A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose 
Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887, 
890 (1981) [hereinafter cited as A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose]; Note, Accomplice Testimony and 
Credibility: "Vouching" and Prosecutorial Abuse of Agreements to Testify Truthfully, 65 MINN. 
L. RBv. 1169 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Accomplice Testimony and Credibility]. The accom-
plice testimony is still suspect even if there is no definite agreement, because the prospect of 
immunity or favorable treatment remains a factor. See Lee, 506 F.2d at 119; Boone v. Paderick, 
541 F.2d 447,451 (4th Cir. 1976) ("the more uncertain the agreement, the greater the incentive 
to make the testimony pleasing to the promisor"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977); Comment, 
Accomplice Testimony Under Conditional Promise of Immunity, 52 COLUM, L. REV, 138, 140 
(1952); A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, supra at 890. But see United States ex rel. Sostre v. Festa, 
513 F.2d 1313, 1318 (2d Cir.) (promise of lighter sentence might be motive to "testify truth-
fully"), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841 (1975). While it is certainly the case that the defense is always 
free to discredit accomplice witnesses by arguing that they have a special incentive to lie, United 
States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d at 273 n.2, such methods are not always successful. Moreover, prose-
cutors may resort to methods such as "truthfulness agreements" (a written promise to testify 
truthfully, admissible as evidence at trial) to bolster the credibility of the accomplice witness in 
the eyes of the jury. See Accomplice Testimony and Credibility, supra, at 1175-77 (criticizing the 
use of such methods). 
63. Use of agreements by the prosecution to gain the testimony of accomplice and informant 
witnesses is widespread. See Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 679 (1980); 
Accomplice Testimony and Credibility, supra note 62, at 1169; A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 
supra note 62, at 888-89. Of the 50 cases involving allegations of false testimony surveyed in this 
Note almost two thirds concerned the testimony of co-conspirators or informant witnesses. Of 
the 18 cases in which the prosecution did not use these suspect witnesses, 4 involved government 
agents. The government is certainly responsible for the false testimony of its own agents. In the 
co-conspirator and paid informant cases, the government is responsible for perjured testimony to 
the extent that it bought and encouraged such testimony through the promise of lenient treat• 
ment or monetary reward. 
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prosecution may be said to have involved itself in the perjury.64 Low-
ering the new trial standard in false testimony cases will provide the 
prosecutor with incentives to elicit only truthtful testimony. In light 
of the government's tacit involvement, the distinction between false 
testimony cases and cases involving proven prosecutorial misconduct 
begins to break down, and the proferred reasons for treating these two 
types of cases differently may be called into question. 
The prosecutorial suppression cases further demonstrate that the 
goal of deterrence does not require a meaningful distinction between 
false testimony cases and cases involving prosecutorial negligence. 
Deterrence is not an important consideration in inadvertent nondisclo-
sure cases. 65 The fact that courts have nevertheless demanded a signif-
icant degree of scrutiny in such cases66 indicates a shift in focus from 
preventing prosecutorial abuse to protecting the rights of the 
accused.67 
Finally, the due process rationale for granting new trials in mis-
conduct cases does not disappear in cases involving the unknowing use 
. of false testimony. Admittedly, the constitutional duty to disclose ex-
culpatory evidence applies only to cases involving prosecutorial partic-
ipation. 68 If, however, an essential function of due process is to 
safeguard the rights of the accused, the rationale for recognizing de-
64. As one commentator has written: 
[P]romises of favorable treatment differ fundamentally from other forms of potentially ex-
culpatory or impeaching evidence. The prosecutor, or his agent, discovered the eyewitness, 
the glass covered with fingerprints, and the evidence reflected in the police report. These 
items existed independently of the prosecutor's initiative. A promise of favorable treatment, 
however, exists only because of the prosecutor's deliberate action. The prosecutor, taking 
advantage of a power conferred on him but denied to the defendant, has himself provided a 
motive to lie. · 
A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, supra note 62, at 895. But see Marrs, supra note 62, at 246 
(arguing that in the case of accomplice witnesses, "the defendant in effect selected the witnesses 
against him and, therefore, the defense can hardly blame the Government for the witness' less 
than laudatory resume"). 
65. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968). The court noted that an 
important concern in negligent nondisclosure cases was to avoid a rule which "would create 
unbearable burdens and uncertainties" on the prosecutor. This consideration, however, is un-
likely to arise in false testimony cases since the duty of the prosecutor to disclose is by definition 
limited in scope to a narrow category of evidence that bears upon the veracity of witness 
testimony. 
66. See note 60 supra and notes 87-90 infra. 
67. See Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to 
Disclose after United States v. Agurs, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 690, 699. The change in focus was first 
noted in Note, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 
YALE L.J. 136, 142 (1964), in which the author pointed to the Supreme Court's decision in Brady 
as evidence of a shifting concern from the conduct of the prosecutor to the prejudicial effect on 
the defendant. See also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("If the suppression of 
evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the 
character of the prosecutor."); Moynahan v. Manson, 419 F. Supp. 1139, 1147 (D. Conn. 1976). 
But see United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that "our cases estab-
lish that in cases of deliberate suppression, 'prophylactic considerations,' designed to deter future 
prosecutorial misconduct are of overriding importance"). 
68. See note 33 supra. 
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fondants' due process rights only where prosecutorial misconduct is 
present is substantially weakened. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that the principle underlying the suppression of evidence cases "is not 
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of 
an unfair trial to the accused."69 
While courts have not entirely abandoned the link to prosecutorial 
behavior in formulating a standard for new trials in false testimony 
cases, 70 recent decisions have focused on the defendant's right to a fair 
trial rather than on the prosecutor's conduct. 71 In cases involving the 
inadvertent suppression of evidence, where the prevention of miscon-
duct is not an issue, many courts have nevertheless found due process 
violations if the suppressed evidence rises to a sufficiently high degree 
of materiality.72 Generally, these courts have held that fundamental 
fairness, and hence due process, is denied whenever disclosure of the 
inadvertently suppressed evidence would lead to a "significant 
chance" that the defendant could avoid conviction. 73 Because the ef-
fect on the accused is the same whether or not the prosecutor knew or 
should have known of the perjury, an approach that ties the denial of 
due process to the "character of the evidence" rather than to the 
"character of the prosecutor" makes good sense. 74 
Even if the introduction of false testimony without prosecutorial 
participation does not violate due process, courts may nevertheless 
conclude that a federal trial tainted by such testimony is "inconsistent 
69. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
70. See note 33 supra. 
71. See note 67 supra. 
72. See note 34 supra. At least one court has argued that a stricter standard of materiality 
should be imposed when the inadvertently suppressed evidence is impeaching rather than excul-
patory. Garrison v. Maggio, 540 F.2d 1271, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1976) (standard for exculpatory 
evidence is "creates a reasonable doubt about defendant's guilt which did not otherwise exist"; 
standard for impeachment evidence is "probably would have resulted in an acquittal"), The 
Seventh Circuit has also advocated a different standard for false testimony cases when the evi-
dence is purely impeaching in nature. United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95, 99 (7th Cir. 1979), 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected any such distinction between impeachment and exculpa-
tory evidence when it held that the rule in intentional misconduct cases is the same regardless of 
whether the evidence goes only to witness credibility. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 
As Judge Wisdom argued in dissent in Garrison, "[o]ur focus should be on the impact of the 
undisclosed evidence on the state's case against the defendant, not on the type of evidence that 
the prosecution failed to release." 540 F.2d at 1276 (emphasis in original). 
73. See, e.g., Ogden v. Wolff, 522 F.2d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 1975); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 
376, 380 (2d Cir. 1974); notes 31-34 supra and accompanying text; note 90 infra. Other courts 
have from time to time imposed differing standards of materiality to determine if due process has 
been violated in negligent nondisclosure cases. See United States v. Miller, 499 F.2d 736, 744 
(10th Cir. 1974) (might standard); Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1224 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(delineating numerous standards including might, reasonable likelihood, apparent impact on 
jury, devalued case of prosecution); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033, 1033-35 (10th Cir. 
1972) (apparent impact on jury), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 933 (1974); United States v. Keogh, 391 
F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968) (probability standard); Barbee v. Warden, 341 F.2d 842, 847 (4th 
Cir. 1964) (harmless error standard). 
74. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976). See also Carlson, supra note 7, at 1187; 
Criminal Law & Procedure, supra note 4, at 182. 
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with the correct administration of criminal justice," which the appel-
late courts must supervise. 75 Federal courts need not find a constitu-
tional violation before exercising their power to ensure fair trials.76 
Rule 33 itself reflects a policy of "fastidious regard" for the untainted 
"administration of justice," which must be balanced against the desire 
for the efficient use of judicial resources. 77 
B. The Newly Discovered Evidence Cases 
Any argument that a special standard should be applied in false 
testimony cases must distinguish that class of cases from other cases 
involving newly discovered evidence. Yet courts have not articulated 
persuasive reasons for applying a different new trial standard in false 
testimony cases than that applied in newly discovered evidence cases 
generally.78 This failure to distinguish false testimony cases explains 
why many courts have departed from the Larrison standard.79 While 
false testimony cases are similar to other cases involving newly discov-
ered evidence, this Note suggests compelling reasons for applying a 
special standard for new trials in false testimony cases. 
First, false testimony may deny the defendant his constitutionally 
protected right to a fair trial. 80 When a witness testifies falsely, he 
creates an error at trial that may very well prejudice the result. But in 
the case of newly discovered evidence, the question whether the evi-
75. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1961). See 
note 60 supra. The Supreme Court has invoked its "supervisory jurisdiction" to require reversal 
in two cases in which the convictions had been tainted by false testimony. Mesarosh v. United 
States, 352 U.S. I, 14 (1956); Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities 
Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 125 (1956). See also State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 586 n.9 
(Minn. 1982). Federal Court supervisory power may be exercised over the administration of 
criminal justice in federal courts only. Thus, this rationale for overturning denials of retrial on 
appeal will not extend to collateral review of state court convictions. In federal habeas corpus 
review of state convictions, only denials of motions for retrial that raise federal constitutional 
questions will be considered. Federal courts may not exercise supervisory powers over state 
courts. See United States ex rel Rice v. Vincent, 491 F.2d 1326, 1332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 880 (1974). 
76. See BA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, at ~ 3306[1] ("Rule 33 is simply a 
means to protect the integrity of the fact-finding process and to insure a fair trial for the accused, 
and its exercise need not be predicated upon finding" a constitutional violation). 
77. Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 351 U.S. 115, 
124 (1956). 
78. The Court in Larrison gave no explanation for why it believed the might test was the 
appropriate rule in false testimony cases. Almost all courts that have applied the test since have 
simply cited Larrison without providing further justification for the rule. Similarly, in Stofsky, 
when the Court adopted the probability test it merely cited Berry without providing any concrete 
reasons as to why that particular test was satisfactory. 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Krasny, 607 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 942 (1980), stating that "the case does not suggest any effective difference between perjured 
testimony and other new evidence, and we can conceive of none." 
80. See notes 31-34 & 69-74 supra and accompanying text; Carlson, supra note 12 at 1187 
argues that "the prosecutor may be completely innocent of wrongdoing and the defendant none-
theless denied a fair trial due to the impact on the jury of a mistaken or spiteful witness's 
testimony." 
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dence had a negative effect on the jury does not arise; the evidence at 
trial may have been incomplete, but it was all true. Thus, the false 
testimony cases raise a fair trial issue not present in the typical rule 33 
case.81 
Second, there is a greater risk that the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess will suffer when tainted testimony is introduced at trial than when 
new evidence is discovered after trial. 82 When false testimony is intro-
duced, it is likely that something suspicious (and unfair) is going on at 
trial. The omission of evidence, on the other hand, cann.ot be pre-
sumed to have a negative impact on the proceedings. 
Third, because the government itself may be at fault in the per-
jured testimony cases by creating incentives for witnesses to testify 
falsely, it should bear a greater responsibility to ensure that the convic-
tion was fair. 83 Moreover, a lower standard of materiality in false tes-
timony cases may be necessary in order to reach those cases in which 
prosecutorial participation is likely to be present but cannot be 
proven.84 
Finally, the danger of inefficient administration of criminal justice 
is less compelling in false testimony cases than in newly discovered 
evidence cases. In the typical rule 33 case the new evidence has not 
been tried and is thus of unknown reliability. 85 In false testimony 
cases, however, once a court makes a determination that the testimony 
was actually false, it is not as difficult to determine the impact on the 
jury of the false testimony in the first trial. 86 Thus, the risk of needless 
retrials is not as great as in the newly discovered evidence cases. 
Although the distinctions between false testimony and other newly 
discovered evidence cases are subtle, they do suggest a rationale for a 
more lenient standard for new trials in cases involving false testimony. 
False testimony cases differ from other newly discovered evidence 
cases in that they contain some, but not all, of the characteristics of 
prosecutorial misconduct cases. 87 Because of these characteristics, a 
defendant who is convicted in part by the use of perjured testimony 
should have a better chance at getting a new trial than a defendant 
who presents some other newly discovered evidence. In the absence of 
81. This appears to be the argument that the Seventh Circuit posited in United States v. 
Johnson, 149 F.2d 31, 44 (7th Cir. 1945), revd., 327 U.S. 106 (1946). See note 23 supra. See also 
State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585-86 (Minn. 1982). 
82. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text. 
84. See notes 65-67 supra and accompanying text. 
85. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 1982). 
86. State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 585 (Minn. 1982). 
87. Even assuming that newly discovered evidence cases could not be properly distinguished, 
if persuasive reasons could be given for a new standard in perjured testimony cases then the 
implication would be that the standard should perhaps be reevaluated in the newly discovered 
evidence cases as well. 
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prosecutorial misconduct, however, a victim of false testimony should 
not be entitled to a presumption that his conviction was illegitimate. 
Thus, the standard for new trial should lie somewhere between a rule 
of automatic reversal and a rule of probability. 
III. FORMULATION OF A NEW STANDARD 
The underlying problem with the existing standards for a new trial 
in false testimony cases is the failure to strike a proper balance be-
tween the interest in the efficient administration of criminal justice and 
the interest in safeguarding the rights of the accused. Literal applica-
tions of the Larrison test would overburden the system with new trials 
based upon insubstantial claims. On the other hand, the probability 
standard will inevitably deny new trials even when the defendant has 
been treated unfairly. Courts can better accommodate the competing 
interests in fairness and efficiency by following a course between Lar-
rison and Stofsky. 88 
The above analysis of the cases and policy considerations points 
toward a compromise test. In order to grant a rule 33 motion for a 
new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of false testimony at 
trial, the court must be reasonably well satisfied that (a) testimony 
given by a material witness at trial was false or that the witness has 
become so thoroughly discredited that the court is unable to determine 
whether the testimony was true or false;89 (b) there is a significant 
chance that a jury with knowledge that the witness testified falsely 
would return a different verdict;90 and (c) the defense was taken by 
88. Some courts have suggested alternative standards that might ease the tension between the 
competing interests at stake, but thus far none have been used in false testimony cases. Although 
the most popular test applied in negligent suppression cases is the significant chance rule deline-
ated at note 60 supra, courts have from time to time suggested a number of different standards. 
See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (where no specific request was made 
retrial was appropriate if "the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise 
exist"); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (new trial in negligent suppression cases 
where a specific request for evidence was made if there was "any reasonable likelihood" that 
disclosure could "have affected the judgment of the jury"); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 
1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 933 (1974) (new trial if the "potential impact 
upon the result" of the suppression of evidence "was apparent"); Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d 
933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1966) (new trial if there is a "substantial likelihood" that the jury, if aware 
of the evidence, would have "entertained a reasonable doubt" as to the guilt of the party); United 
States v. Turner, 490 F. Supp. 583, 607 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (new trial when there is a reasonable 
likelihood that false testimony could have affected judgment of jury as to a material point), affd., 
633 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). 
89. The La"ison test, which requires that the court be "reasonably well satisfied that the 
testimony given by a material witness is false," does not allow the judge to grant a new trial when 
the witness is so untrustworthy that the judge does not know what to believe. See notes 12-16 
supra. The suggested modification of the La"ison test will permit the trial court to grant retrials 
in these situations. 
90. The significant chance test suggested here is substantially the same as the standard ap-
plied by"the majority of courts in the inadvertent suppression cases, see notes 60 & 73 supra, and 
advocated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 
122 (1976). See also United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 765, 769 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
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surprise by the false testimony and was unable to meet it or know of its 
falsity at the time of the trial.91 
Because a new trial should neither be always required nor always 
denied in false testimony cases, a balancing approach is essential. But 
a balancing approach, by its very nature, compromises both the final-
ity and fair trial interests present in situations where false testimony 
has been given. The "significant chance" rule suggested in this Note is 
not a panacea, but it is an improvement over both a standard that 
"might" allow new trials in every case and a standard that would deny 
new trials to defendants unless they "probably" would have been ac-
quitted. Thus, the "significant chance" rule would at least cure the 
most glaring defects in the existing tests. 92 
First, the "significant chance" rule eliminates the danger of the 
virtual automatic reversal inherent in the Larrison "might" test. A 
new trial could not be granted based upon the remote possibility of a 
different conclusion. Rather, the trial court would have to find a sig-
nificant chance that the result would be different. Second, the pro-
posed test properly takes into account the impact of the perjured 
testimony on witness credibility. Third, by providing a standard that 
Morell, 524 F.2d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1975); Ogden v. Wolff, 522 F.2d 816, 822 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 427 U.S. 911 (1976); Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213, 1223 (5th Cir. 1974). 
91. This is, of course, the same wording used in Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 88 
(7th Cir. 1928). As has already been demonstrated, there seems to be little or no dispute con• 
ceming this third requirement. See note 11 supra. 
92. The "significant chance" test would require new trials in all cases in which retrials would 
be granted under the "probability" test but not in cases covered by the "might" test where there 
is only a slight possibility of a different conclusion. What would be required is a significant 
chance of avoiding conviction. See note 32 supra. As the court made clear in United States v, 
Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969), the test requires only a significant chance that a reason-
able doubt be created in the minds of enough jurors to result in a hung jury, not that there be a 
significant chance that twelve jurors would acquit. Some lower courts opinions have already 
attempted to give content to the term "significant chance." See United States v. Frye, 548 F.2d 
765, 769 (8th Cir. 1977) (significant chance test requires lesser standard of materiality than 
probability test); United States v. Rosner, 516 F.2d 269, 273, 278 (2d Cir. 1975) (significant 
chance test not met where "highly unlikely" new evidence would have changed the result; "the 
standard demands more than the possibility of a different result upon retrial"), cert. denied, 427 
U.S. 911 (1976); Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1974) (significant chance test 
met "in view of the serious doubts," court "entertain[ed] about whether the right person was 
convicted"); Miller, 411 F.2d at 832 (2d Cir. 1969) (significant chance test met where court could 
not confidently judge the effect of the new evidence). In United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375 
(1985), the Supreme Court attempted to find a standard for cases involving specific requests for 
disclosure that was stricter than a harmless error standard but more lenient to the defense than 
the probability rule applied in newly discovered evidence cases. The Court came up with a stan-
dard of materiality that would require a new trial "if there is a reasonable probability that, had 
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent." 105 S. Ct. at 3384. The Court explained that a "reasonable probability" is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. 105 S. Ct. at 3384. This was the same stan-
dard the court adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), for cases in which 
evidence is not introduced because of the incompetence of counsel. This Note prefers a "signifi-
cant chance" standard because it believes that the term "reasonable probability" is too difficult to 
distinguish from the "probability of acquittal" standard. The Note does agree, however, that a 
"significant chance" is a chance "sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
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is less rigid than either the "might" or the "probability" test, the sig-
nifi.cant chance standard allows for more forthright application of the 
law.93 Fourth, the test prevents unfair convictions resulting from ap-
plication of the Stofsky probability test because it allows an accused a 
new trial whenever he has a signifi.cant chance of avoiding convic-
tion. 94 Fifth, the test better preserves the independent functions of 
judge and jury by clarifying that the case must go to the jury every 
time there is a signifi.cant chance of avoiding conviction. Thus, the 
judge need not usurp the jury's function by guessing what its probable 
verdict would be.95 Finally, the test would preserve the prosecutor's 
incentive to serve the cause of justice by providing an intermediate 
standard that is less severe than the automatic reversal standard ap-
plied in the intentional misconduct cases, yet strong enough to reach 
those cases in which it is difficult to prove prosecutorial participation. 
CONCLUSION 
The integrity of the judicial process requires that defendants be 
accorded a fair trial free from the taint of perjured testimony. But the 
viability of the system also requires that criminal justice be adminis-
tered efficiently and that the public have faith in the finality of judg-
ments. Pi;esent standards for the granting of a new trial in false 
testimony cases have sacrificed judicial integrity in their failure to rec-
oncile these competing interests. The intermediate test presented in 
this Note offers a viable resolution to this conflict. 
- Daniel Wolf 
93. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text for discussion of dishonest applications of 
the might and probability standards. 
94. See note 32 supra. 
95. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 119 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
